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Abstract
Gender di¤erences in preferences regarding social relationships and
competitive environments are well documented in psychology and eco-
nomics. Research also shows that social relationships and competition
among co-workers are a¤ected by the incentive schemes workers are ex-
posed to. We combine these two stylized facts and hypothesize that men
and women di¤er in how they rate their co-worker relationships when
they work under individual incentives, group incentives, or a combina-
tion of the two. This hypothesis is explored using survey data on 14,743
highly educated employees from 78 di¤erent organizations in the Nether-
lands. We nd correlational evidence that, in the absence of individual
incentives, group incentives improve co-worker relationships for women,
but deteriorate co-worker relationships for men.
Keywords: Incentives, gender di¤erences, interpersonal relations, so-
cial interaction.
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1 Introduction
In economics, we typically evaluate incentive devices through the e¤ects they
have on worker productivity. However, literature indicates that the conse-
quences of implementing incentives are not limited to productivity alone. In
this paper we investigate the relation between the quality of co-worker social re-
lations and the presence of individual incentives, team incentives, or both, using
observational data from a large scale survey among Dutch employees. Empirical
research in organizational psychology and management suggests that organiza-
tions should care about the e¤ect incentive devices may have on co-worker re-
lations. The quality of co-worker relations has been shown to be an important
determinant of job satisfaction (Hodson, 1997; Ducharme and Martin, 2000;
Morgeson and Humphrey, 2006; Westover and Taylor, 2011), commitment to
an organization (Riordan and Gri¤eth, 1995), and turnover (Price and Mueller,
1981; Morrison, 2004; Chiaburu and Harrison, 2008; Skaalvik and Skaalvik,
2011). In line with this, recent studies suggest that satisfaction regarding co-
worker relations allow rms to pay lower wages (Borzaga and Depedri, 2005;
Hamilton et al. 2003).
Why might incentive schemes have an e¤ect on co-worker relations? Dur
and Sol (2010) take a game-theoretical approach to analyze such e¤ects. They
nd that the use of team or relative incentives can stimulate social interaction
between co-workers. The intuition is that social interaction may promote co-
worker altruism, which in turn helps to resolve the free-rider problem in case
of team incentives and facilitates (tacit) collusion in case of relative incentives.
Other theoretical studies have focused on helping behavior or cooperation in the
workplace, nding that team incentives promote these behaviors, while individ-
ual incentives lead to a reduction of such behaviors (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1986;
Drago and Turnbull, 1988; Itoh, 1991; Rob and Zemsky, 2002; and Corneo and
Rob, 2003) . Empirical research also suggests that incentives can a¤ect cooper-
ative and competitive attitude towards co-workers. Mitchell and Silver (1990)
examine goal setting in an experiment where students face individual goals or
group goals. They assess feelings of cooperation and competition among par-
ticipants and nd them to be more competitive and less cooperative in the
treatment where participants face individual goals. Other experiments, such as
that of Barnes et al. (2004) and Quigley et al. (2007) nd similar results.
Participants facing individual incentives choose to cooperate less compared to
the treatment in which they face group incentives. We hypothesize that such a
change in focus on ones individual outcome rather than that of the group as a
whole can a¤ect the perception of social relations within the group. This is in
line with what would be expected based on cooperation theory (Deutsch 1949a,
1949b, 1973) which states that goal interdependencies positively a¤ect social
relations within the group. This theory has found support in empirical stud-
ies which nd that in comparison to individual goals, cooperative goals have a
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positive e¤ect on actual assistance, communication, and support between group
members (De Vries and Slavin 1978; Hamblin et al. 1971).
In addition to studying the relationship between incentives and social rela-
tions among co-workers, we examine whether individual and group incentives
a¤ect the perception of social relations di¤erently for men and women. There
are two types of observations from empirical and experimental research under-
pinning our expectation of this gender di¤erence. First, gender di¤erences in
preferences for type of peer-relationships have been well established in psychol-
ogy. Jarvinen and Nicholls (1996) look at the social goals that are involved
in adolescent peer relationships through a questionnaire answered by rst-year
high school students. While male students score signicantly higher in the
importance they place on competitive social goals such as dominance and lead-
ership, female students score signicantly higher in social goals described as
intimacy and nurturance. Generally, studies in psychology nd di¤erences be-
tween genders in the preferred level of intimacy in relationships, where women
prefer more intimate relationships than men (Agrawal et al., 2002; Sy et al.,
2003; Rose and Asher 2004; Vigil, 2007). The change in behavior caused by
incentives can therefore a¤ect the perception of social relations di¤erently for
men and women: These new behaviors can lean towards either a male or female
preference of how colleagues interact. More concretely, we expect women to
rate co-worker relationships higher when team incentives are introduced. This
expectation is reversed for individual incentives, since such incentives can entail
an element of competition. For men, we expect the opposite.
A second reason for gender di¤erences in preferences relies on a di¤erence in
social norms men and women are subjected to. Research indicates that Western
societies promote and reward autonomy and independence in men, while pro-
moting pro-social behavior and interdependence in women (Bakan 1966; Mac-
coby 1990; Markus and Oyserman 1989). Pan and Houser (2011) provide an
overview of gender di¤erences in pro-social behavior including theories from
psychology as well as empirical ndings from experimental economics. Examin-
ing this literature, they nd that women have a preference to conform to social
norms that dictate pro-social behavior. Hibbard and Buhrmester (2010) study
the social and emotional downside to competitiveness among 12th grade stu-
dents and nd that female students that score high on their measure of compet-
itiveness have less succesfull interpersonal relationships with their peers. They
believe this is due to competition being a male type trait that is at odds with
existing social norms for females. In our context such gender di¤erences may
imply that women are less successful in maintaining good social relationships
in environments that foster competitive behavior through individual incentives,
but more successful in maintaining these relationships when incentives call for
pro-social behavior. Again, we expect the reverse for men.
Summarizing, we hypothesize that womens perceived co-worker relation-
ships are a¤ected positively by group incentives and negatively by individual
incentives, while mens perceived co-worker relations are negatively a¤ected by
group incentives and positively a¤ected by individual incentives. This gender
di¤erence in the e¤ect of incentives on social relations has largely gone unex-
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plored. Heywood and Wei (2006) use representative US survey data to examine
the e¤ects of several incentive devices on overall job satisfaction. In their analy-
sis, they separate these e¤ects on overall job satisfaction for men and women,
but do not do so for their measure of co-worker relationships. While they do
not nd any evidence that performance pay inuences co-worker relationships
for the full sample, it is unclear what they would nd if they seperated these
e¤ects for men and women. Artz (2008) uses UK representative survey data
and looks at gender di¤erences in the relation between incentives and overall
job satisfaction. Coworker friendliness is one of the facets of job satisfaction in
the data. He nds no signicant relation between individual performance pay
and the way respondents rate co-worker friendliness for either gender. However,
he does nd that in other facets of job satisfaction men respond more favorably
to individual incentive pay, and suggests that this may be due to men having a
preference for a more competitive environment.
In our study, we use data from an employee-employer survey conducted
in 78 large corporations in the Netherlands in 2005 and 2007. The employee
survey contains a question on satisfaction regarding co-worker social relations
in the workplace. The employer survey includes items on a number of possible
determinants including reward structure, sector, and percentages of part-time
employment in the organization. The data allow us to control for individual
heterogeneity and observable company characteristics. Combining both years,
the entire sample counts 14,743 respondents.
Our key ndings are that the presence of a group incentive is negatively
related to satisfaction with co-worker relations for men, while women rate their
co-worker relations better when provided with a group incentive. The presence
of individual incentives is not related to the way women rate their social relations
on the workoor, while it has a signicantly positive relation with the way men
rate these relationships. Lastly, we nd indications that the e¤ect of the presence
of a group incentive on co-worker social relations is negated when combined
with an individual incentive. These ndings are correlational, but nevertheless
striking in the sense that they show that incentives and co-worker relations are
connected in an important way, and that gender plays an essential role in the
way they are related.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the
data. Section 3 describes the methodology. In Section 4 we present our ndings
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The survey data we use were originally collected for a yearly ranking of organi-
zations based on employee satisfaction, HRM-policies, and working conditions.
The results are published in Intermediair, a Dutch weekly magazine with career-
related articles for the highly educated. Data are gathered through pen and
pencil surveys. The employee survey data were collected by the research bureau
SatisAction in collaboration with Tilburg University. Additionally, we use the
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Total sample Men Women
Percentage of women 37.2
Non-prot 34.7 34.0 35.7
Percentage of part-time employees 22.8 20.6 26.6
Management position 23.1 27.8 15.2
Age 16-25 7.6 6.5 9.5
Age 26-35 34.3 30.3 41.1
Age 36-45 31.2 30.8 31.9
Age 46-55 21.2 25.3 14.3
Age 56 and older 5.6 7.1 3.0
Lower vocational training 0.9 0.9 1.0
Intermediate vocational training 24.5 21.4 29.9
Higher vocational training 43.8 46.0 40.0
University 22.9 22.9 23.0
Post-university 7.8 8.8 6.2
Year 2005 26.2 25.5 27.5
employer survey data collected for Intermediair by the Amsterdam Institute of
Labor Studies (AIAS). These surveys are conducted among the HRM-managers
of the organizations. We merge these two sets of survey data to learn how the
perceived social relations in the employee survey are related to the information
regarding the prevailing incentives provided by HRM managers.
Both for-prot and non-prot organizations from a range of di¤erent sec-
tors are included in our dataset. We use the survey data from the years 2005
and 2007, because only in these years HRM-managers were asked whether the
company provided individual and/or group incentives. We have dropped all
observations that missed responses to questions that are relevant for our analy-
sis. A small number of organizations were a part of the sample in both 2005
and 2007. For these organizations we only included the data from the year
in which they contributed most survey respondents. This results in dropping
4,636 observations, giving us a total of 14,743 respondents from 78 di¤erent
organizations. As a requirement for participation in the survey, organizations
needed to have a minimum of 100 employees. Respondents were fairly spread
out across organizations with only 3 organizations contributing more than 5 per-
cent to the sample, and none contributing more than 10 percent. Organizations
in the survey cover a total of 21 sectors. Most respondents come from nancial
institutions, insurance companies, ICT companies, government services, and
government organizations. Combined, these ve sectors account for almost 75
percent of the respondents included in the analysis. The descriptive statistics
are summarized and split out by gender in Table 1.
Of our respondents 37.2 percent is female. The average percentage of female
employees within sectors is 36 with a standard deviation of 14.7. ICT compa-
nies and companies active in the steel industry have the lowest percentage of
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Table 2: Pleasant social relations with direct colleagues
Total % Men % Women %
Strongly Disagree 0.5 0.5 0.4
Disagree 1.8 1.8 1.6
Neutral 9.0 10.0 7.4
Agree 52.9 54.1 50.9
Strongly Agree 35.9 33.6 39.7
females in our sample. The percentage of female respondents in these sectors
is 17.9 percent and 19.3, respectively. Employment agencies have the highest
percentage of females in our sample. In this sector 78.6 percent of the respon-
dents are female. Men and women di¤er in their levels of education, with men
being slightly higher educated than women. Out of the men in the sample, 77.7
percent has at least had higher vocational training, while this percentage is 69.2
percent for women. Signicantly more men than women hold a management
position within the organization and signicantly more women indicate that
they work part-time.
In our analysis, we relate the reported quality of co-worker relations to the
presence of an individual or group incentive and investigate whether gender plays
a role in the relationship between the two. We measure the quality of co-worker
relationship satisfaction by the response that is given to the statement: "The
social relations with my direct colleagues are pleasant". Responses are recorded
on a 5 point Likert scale where respondents could indicate the degree to which
they agreed with this statement. Possible responses ranged from "I strongly dis-
agree" to "I strongly agree". The statement mentions direct colleagues, making
respondents focus on interactions in their own environment rather than impres-
sions they may have from the organization as a whole. Aggregated responses to
this question can be found in Table 2. On average, women are somewhat more
positive about co-worker relationships, though the di¤erence is not statistically
signicant.
Out of the respondents in our sample, 76.4 percent received an individual
incentive, while 47.2 percent received a group incentive. Within our sample it is
quite common that respondents receive both an individual and group incentive.
This is the case for 41.8 percent of the respondents. Table 3 gives an overview of
the incentive schemes respondents were exposed to. The respondents that only
receive a group incentive are from 4 di¤erent companies, active in 3 di¤erent
sectors. These are electricity (14.9 %), ICT (45.8%) and employment agencies
(39.3%).
3 Methodology
We use an ordered probit estimation model accounting for the fact that our
dependent variable, the response a worker gives on a 5-point Likert scale, is
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Table 3: Incentives
Total % Men % Women %
Individual incentive only 34.5 35.2 33.3
Group incentive only 5.4 5.5 5.2
Individual and group incentive 41.8 41.2 43.0
No incentive scheme 18.3 18.1 18.5
ordinal. We control for age, level of education, whether respondents hold a
managerial position, work part-time, whether respondents are working for a
non-prot organisation, and for the year in which observations were gathered.
We classied age into 5 age groups: 16 to 25, 26 to 35, 36 to 45, 46 to 55 and
56 and older. We added sector dummies as control variables in the regression
to control for systematic di¤erences between sectors with regard to social re-
lations among workers. Variation between sectors in our dependent variable
could arise due to, for instance, market circumstances in the sector, di¤erences
in production technology, or sorting of workers with particular characteristics
into a sector. We correct for potential clustering at the company level using Hu-
ber/White corrected standard errors addressing the possibility of a downward
bias in standard errors due to an underlying similarity of respondents within
companies. The relation of the individual and group incentive schemes with
the perception of social relations by the worker may not simply be additive.
Instead, it might be the case that the e¤ect of one type of incentive scheme
depends on the presence of the other. For this reason we include dummies for
respondents facing only individual incentives, only group incentives, and both
individual and group incentives. Our basic model is as follows:
Y i = 
0Xi + "i, where
0BBBB@Y =
1 if Y i < 1
2 if 1  Y i < 2
3 if 2  Y i < 3
4 if 3  Y i < 4
5 if 4 < Y i
1CCCCA (1)
The outcome Y can take on any of the integers 1 through 5, which represent
the ve possible responses to the statement: "The social relations with my direct
colleagues are pleasant". These responses range from "I strongly disagree" (1) to
"I strongly agree" (5). This outcome is determined by the underlying propensity
denoted by Y . The threshold parameters delimiting each possible response
or category are denoted by 1 to 4. The variable Xi is a vector containing
explanatory variables specic to each respondent. This includes the type of
incentive scheme a respondent faces. The 0 is a vector of coe¢ cients, and "i is
the error term reecting the inuence of unobserved variables on the underlying
propensity Y i . This error term is assumed to be normally distributed. The
expression 0Xi can be described as
0Xi = 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3::::::+ NXN . (2)
6
The covariates are indicated by the variables X1 to XN . Three of these are
dummy variables indicating whether a respondent faces only individual incen-
tives, only group incentives, or both. To study the gender di¤erences we perform
the estimation seperately for men and women in our sample.
Estimated coe¢ cients of our model need to be interpreted with some care.
The sign of the coe¢ cient only tells us how our independent variable relates
to the probabilities of respondents choosing the end categories "I strongly dis-
agree" (1) and "I strongly agree" (5) (Greene, 2002). After some straightforward
calculations, we can get a clearer view of the way in which our independent vari-
ables relate to the predicted probabilities for each category. For example, the
probability that a respondent with a specic set of values for our independent
variables chooses category 1, can be calculated as
Pr(Y = 1) = Pr(Y  < 1)
= Pr("i < 1   (1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3::::::+ NXN )) (3)
= (1   0Xi),
where () describes the cumulative distribution function of the normal distri-
bution. We calculate the probabilities of the categories 2 through 5 in a similar
way. For the categories that are in-between the end categories, the calculation
is
Pr(Y = C) = Pr(C 1  Y i < C) = (C   0Xi)  (C 1   0Xi), (4)
where C indicates the response category. The probability of choosing the end
response category, 5, is expressed as follows
Pr(Y = 5) = Pr(4 < Y

i ) = 1  (4   0Xi). (5)
The marginal e¤ect of our continuous independent variables, or the way
in which our independent variables a¤ect the above probabilities, can be cal-
culated by taking the partial derivative with respect to these variables from
the above equations (Greene, 2002). It is possible to nd the marginal e¤ects
for our binary independent variables by calculating the di¤erence in the above
probabilities when these variables take on a value of either zero or one. While
continuous variables would be kept at the mean, e¤ects may remain unclear
when keeping other binary variables at either a value of zero or one for this cal-
culation. By doing this we would e¤ectively evaluate di¤erences in probabilities
for only subsets of our sample. For this reason we follow Greenes suggestion
(Greene 2002) and take the derivative with respect to our binary variables as if
they were continuous for an accurate approximation.
4 Empirical results
Table 4 contains the ordered probit estimates. We run the estimation for both
the whole sample and for men and women seperately.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit estimation results; dependent variable "The social
relations with my direct colleagues are pleasant"
Total Men Women
Coe¤. Prob. Coe¤. Prob. Coe¤. Prob.
Non-prot -0.113 0.353 -0.054 0.693 -0.394 0.183
(0.122) (0.137) (0.295)
Perc. Women 0.203 0.133 0.235 0.192 0.117 0.580
(0.135) (0.180) (0.212)
Part-time 0.178 0.135 0.376 0.020** -0.034 0.845
(0.119) (0.162) (0.175)
Male -0.140 0.000***
(0.021)
Manager 0.143 0.000*** 0.170 0.000*** 0.073 0.112
(0.024) (0.028) (0.046)
Age 26-35 -0.056 0.139 -0.109 0.034** 0.002 0.969
(0.038) (0.052) (0.056)
Age 36-45 -0.189 0.000*** -0.247 0.000*** -0.130 0.028**
(0.039) (0.052) (0.059)
Age 46-55 -0.198 0.000*** -0.264 0.000*** -0.117 0.080*
(0.041) (0.053) (0.067)
Age 56+ -0.159 0.003*** -0.203 0.002*** -0.146 0.203
(0.054) (0.065) (0.114)
Interm. vocational training 0.075 0.373 0.071 0.498 0.085 0.553
(0.084) (0.104) (0.143)
Higher vocational training 0.129 0.121 0.172 0.096 0.078 0.586
(0.084) (0.103) (0.142)
University educ. 0.204 0.017** 0.244 0.020** 0.152 0.295
(0.085) (0.105) (0.145)
Post university educ. 0.183 0.042** 0.278 0.012** 0.014 0.931
(0.090) (0.110) (0.156)
Year 2005 0.108 0.000*** 0.117 0.000*** 0.090 0.018**
(0.024) (0.031) (0.038)
Only Indiv incentive 0.102 0.002*** 0.099 0.015** 0.073 0.192
(0.033) (0.041) (0.056)
Only Grp incentive -0.017 0.766 -0.196 0.006*** 0.375 0.000***
(0.059) (0.072) (0.102)
Both Indiv and Grp incentive 0.117 0.001*** 0.115 0.011** 0.098 0.094*
(0.036) (0.045) (0.059)
Log Likelihood -14724.3 -9327.2 -5360.0
LR statistic 380.0797 268.8958 116.2151
Prob. (LR stat) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 14,661 9,208 5,453
Notes: Standard errors are reported in brackets below the coe¢ cients. Robust standard
errors, corrected for clustering at the company level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 4 gives us an indication of which covariates are signicantly related to
our dependent variable. However, to get a sense of the magnitude of these
e¤ects, we calculate the marginal e¤ect of the incentive schemes as described
in Section 3. These are reported in Table 5. The numbers show the changes in
the predicted probability of each of the choice categories on the 5 point Likert
scale for a variation in the presence of individual incentives, group incentives,
and both, allowing us to get a sense of the e¤ect-size. Figure 1 depicts these
marginal e¤ects.
We obtain the following results. When looking at our total sample, only
the provision of an individual incentive is related to perceived co-worker rela-
tions, while the group incentives are unrelated to our dependent variable. How-
ever, this result hides an important gender di¤erence in the way these incentive
schemes a¤ect perceived co-worker relations. By running the estimation seper-
ately for men and women, we observe a gender di¤erence in the relationship
between the incentive schemes and perceived co-worker relations. Specically,
being exposed to a group incentive has an opposite e¤ect on the way men and
women evaluate their social relations in the work place. The results are per-
haps most clearly visible in Figure 1. We see that men perceive their co-worker
relations to be better when they face an individual incentive scheme. In the
presence of this individual incentive, they are more likely to choose the response
indicating that they strongly agree with the statement that social relations with
direct colleagues are pleasant. This is matched by a reduction in the predicted
probability of choosing response categories 1 through 4. For women we observe
a similar pattern, but weaker and not statistically signicant. Most strikingly,
a group incentive scheme a¤ects our dependent variable in opposite ways for
men and women. The middle of Figure 1 illustrates this e¤ect. For men, the
group incentive increases the probability of respondents choosing categories 1
through 4, while decreasing the probability of men choosing response category 5
by 7.1%. Responses therefore shift towards the response categories that reect
a lower level of satisfaction regarding co-worker relations. For women, the esti-
mated probabilities move in the opposite direction. While the probabilities of
choosing response categories 1 through 4 decrease, the probability of choosing
response category 5 increases by 14.4%, indicating a higher level of satisfaction
regarding co-worker relations.
When an individual bonus is included in conjunction with the group bonus,
the e¤ect the total scheme has on respondents perceived co-worker relations is
similar to the e¤ect of having only an individual bonus scheme. One explanation
for this result could be that whenever people face both individual and group
bonus schemes, a conict arises between individual interest on the one hand
and group interest on the other. When workers place their individual interest
above that of the group, and this is reected in their actions, perceived co-
worker relations are similar to the situation where workers face only individual
bonus incentives. In recent literature, several studies have indicated such a
conict when combining the use of individual and group incentives. Quigly et
9
al. (2007) conduct a lab experiment focusing on the e¤ects of incentive schemes
on information sharing. They nd that mixed incentives lead to lower levels of
information sharing than group incentives. Additionally, they nd no signicant
di¤erence between information shared when participants face individual and
when they face mixed incentives1 . An alternative explanation that we can not
rule out is that in organizations that o¤er both individual and group incentives,
the individual incentives may be much stronger than the group incentives. Such
a focus on individual incentives would lead workers to behave in a manner
comparable to those facing only individual incentives, and result in the similarity
of perceived co-worker relations that we nd in the data.
1See Barnes et al. (2011) for a similar result.
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5 Conclusion
Theories as well as earlier evidence suggest that the use of incentives can have
an important impact on the the way employees experience co-worker relation-
ships. We have hypothesized that this relationship depends on both gender and
the type of incentives employees are faced with. In our empirical analysis, we
nd a signicant positive relation between individual incentives and co-worker
relations for men. We see a similar pattern for women, but this relation is not
signicant. In line with our hypothesis, we nd an opposite relation between
incentives and co-worker relations for men and women when they are faced
with only a group incentive. The estimated e¤ect size is substantial. While the
presence of group incentives relate to a 14.4 percent increase in the predicted
probability of choosing to strongly agree with the statement "The social rela-
tions with my direct colleagues are pleasant" for women, for men the predicted
probability of choosing this end category decreases by 7.1%.
Estimates from our ordered probit model do not identify the direction of
causation. There are two main reasons why endogeneity is a problem in our
analysis. First, it is possible that there is a self-selection of respondents into
specic payment schemes, or into jobs that are more likely to have a specic
kind of payment scheme. Second, organizations choose the type of incentive
that they wish to employ and may tailor these to pre-existing co-worker re-
lationships. However, our estimates provide a sense of the magnitude of the
association, and expose that gender plays a key role in the way incentives are
related to the way workers experience their co-worker relations. Such a result
has potential HR implications. It suggests that the use of incentive devices
can have profound e¤ects on co-worker relationships. Furthermore, when group
incentives are used, these e¤ects may di¤er widely by gender. Understanding
the social e¤ects these incentives can evoke can be important in several ways.
When choosing incentives, being aware of such e¤ects enables managers to use
those incentive devices that match their employees and promote desirable so-
cial e¤ects. When promoting gender diversity in the workplace, the use of the
right kind of incentive can make a workplace environment simultaneously more
attractive for women and less attractive for men, or vice versa.
This managerial implication is in line with those presented in a literature
in economics that studies gender di¤erences in competitive preferences in a lab
setting. These lab experiments however do not stress or include social relations
in their analysis. Instead, they nd policy recommendations similar to the ones
we present here, but based on a di¤erence in preferences for competition between
men and women. A preference for either a competitive or non-competitive
environment ties into the use of incentives, as it is through the use of incentives
that managers can either promote or suppress competitive behaviors on the
workoor. Niederle and Versterlund (2007) conduct such a lab experiment and
nd that for a given level of performance, there is a large gender gap when
it comes to self-selection into tournaments, with men being far more likely to
choose to compete than women. Dargnies (2012) studies gender di¤erences in
self-selection into tournaments in a lab experiment and also nds that men are
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more likely to participate in tournaments. Additionally, she nds that men are
more likely to compete as individuals than they are as part of a team. Gneezy
et al. (2009) conrm these ndings when participants are part of a patriarchal
society, but nd that the gender di¤erence in behavior is reversed when the
experiment is conducted in a matrilineal society. Rather than focusing on self-
selection into tournaments, Kuhn and Villeval (2014) allow participants in their
experiment to choose either individual or team-based pay. They nd that in
comparison to men, women show greater attraction to team based pay.
Our study has the interesting feature that it suggests a related, but di¤erent
kind of gender di¤erence in preferences that is hard to pick up in a lab exper-
iment setting and has not been addressed in previous literature in economics.
While our data do not allow us to deal with some of the issues of endogeneity
we encounter, we hope that our ndings motivate future research on this topic.
We are currently trying to set up a eld experiment in which we are able to
detect these social e¤ects of incentive schemes and learn more about the gender
di¤erences that are related to them. A eld experimental setup will also allow
us to address the aformentioned issues of endogeneity.
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